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We study a SIRD epidemic process among a heterogeneous population that interacts
through a network. We give general upper bounds for the size of the epidemic starting
from a (small) set of initially infected individuals. Moreover, we characterize the epidemic
reproduction numbers in terms of the spectral properties of a relevant matrix based on
the network adjacency matrix and the infection rates. We suggest that this can be used
to identify sub-networks that have high reproduction numbers before the epidemic reaches
and picks up in them. When we base social contact on a random graph with given vertex
degrees, we give limit theorems on the fraction of infected individuals. For a given social
distancing individual strategies, we establish the epidemic reproduction number R0 which
can be used to identify network vulnerability and inform vaccination policies. In the second
part of the paper we study the equilibrium of the social distancing game and we show that
voluntary social distancing will always be socially sub-optimal. Our numerical study using
Covid-19 data serves to quantify the absolute and relative utility gaps across age cohorts.
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1 Introduction
The first wave of the coronavirus crisis has seen an unprecedented scale of lockdown mea-
sures, imposed worldwide and in many cases very strictly in order to mitigate the public
health threat. Unarguably, the economic and social impact has been devastating. The path
to reopening the economy remains uncertain, and outbreaks are expected to re-emerge as
soon as measures are relaxed. While lockdown measures have been shown to have saved
a tremendous number of lives, there is little disagreement that they cannot be maintained
in the long run. With a disease so contagious and widespread, the long run will indeed be
measured in years rather than months. The path forward, at least until vaccines are proven
effective to some extent, is more likely to rely on proper guidelines from the governments,
targeted quarantines, combined with the transparent information for the public rather than
strict and un-targeted lockdowns.
Despite that the public adherence to guidelines – even if those were optimal– is the
driving force in the post-lockdown world, few epidemic models incorporate individuals’
decision-making. One notable exception is [Jones et al., 2020], who integrate individual
decision making in a Susceptible - Infectious - Recovered (SIR) model of contagion. This
paper is closest in spirit to ours, and they demonstrate using U.S. micro-data that indi-
viduals started to socially distance earlier than the governments mandated to do so. They
also investigate the optimal social distancing policy, and show that this policy should be
mandated for as long as possible until an effective vaccine is available. Other works fo-
cusing specifically on Susceptible - Infectious - Recovered/Dead (SIRD) modeling in the
context of this public health crisis, e.g., [Acemoglu et al., 2020], suggest an agenda to make
epidemiological models more realistic, and in particular to address multiple sources of het-
erogeneity. First, it is clear that the disease treats people very differently, and, while no
age group is spared, the elderly have significantly worse outcomes. At the same time, the
contact pattern is nowhere close to the homogenous mixing of the classical SIR model.
[Acemoglu et al., 2020] solve the social planner’s problem for a multi-type (multi-risk) SIR
model and leave for further research the case where interaction occurs according to a social
graph structure.
In this paper, we set up a heterogeneous SIRD model on a random graph that underlies
the social contact structure. Individuals have different types and death risk if they contract
the disease. Moreover, types derive the connectedness profiles across the population. For
this underlying model of contagion, we study the decision problem for each individual –
parametrized by her type. Like in [Alvarez et al., 2020], we use the value of statistical
life (VSL) as the basis for the individual decision. VSL incorporates all elements that an
individual deems worth for her and is determined on the basis of how much the individual
is willing to pay in order to decrease her risk of death by a small amount, e.g., a tenth of
a percent. This fits precisely into the analysis of how individuals perceive the risk of death
due to contracting COVID-19. The average risk of death, conditional on contracting the
disease, is of the order of percentage point. The decision to socially distance is precisely in
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order to mitigate the risk of death. In such an event, the loss to the individual is her VSL.
In balance stands the cost to the individual from socially distancing, and we define this
as a fraction of the yearly value of statistical life (VSLY). VSLY is, roughly, VSL divided
by the remaining life expectancy. A free parameter quantifies how much of VSLY depends
on the interactions over the time horizon of the decision. Clearly, the dependence of the
decision on the individual type (age) comes through a plethora of sources: VSL and VSLY
themselves, the risk of death, the connectivity profile.
The risk to contract the disease depends on the fraction of potentially healthy linkages
to the total number of linkages in the system. We will call this the global network immunity.
When the network immunity is high, the risk to contract the disease is low for all types.
The network immunity depends on the social distancing decision of all individuals and it
is obtained as a fixed point, which is our notion of voluntary social distancing (Laissez-
Faire) equilibrium. Individuals hypothesize a level of global network immunity. Based on
the implied risk to contract the disease, their death risk if they do contract the disease,
their value of statistical life and their types, they decide on the social distancing strategy.
Then an actual network immunity emerges as the contagion spreads, albeit in our model
the spread is instantaneous. The actual network immunity must match the hypothesized
network immunity in equilibrium. To account for the increase of the risk of death – for
all types– should the hospital system be overwhelmed, the risk of death depends on the
network immunity in addition to the individual type, and our results are robust to various
specifications of this dependence.
Our first set of results is concerned with the size of the epidemic for a given social
distancing strategy profile across individuals and for a given network underlying the social
interactions (that we call interaction graph). An infection matrix is obtained from the ad-
jacency matrix and the type dependent rates with which susceptible individuals seek social
contact. Based on the spectrum of the infection matrix, we characterize the amplification
of the epidemic, namely the ratio between the fraction of infected individuals during the
contagion process and the size of the initial seed. In particular, we show that if the largest
singular value of the infection matrix is smaller than one, then the expected amplification
is of the order O(
√
n) in the size of the network n. This represents a testable condition
whether a given interaction graph is prone to contagion and can guide governments where
to focus an eventual vaccine or identify potential infection hotspots. In the same spirit,
we extend our analysis to the case of random graphs underlying the social interaction. We
impose mild conditions on the degree distribution of the susceptible population, whereas
infectious and recovered individuals’ degree distribution can be more arbitrary. There is a
maximum degree condition, which allows for degrees that grow sub-linearly with the net-
work size. Our results are in this case asymptotic, and for large networks we establish
the network immunity as the unique fixed point of an analytic function depending on the
degree distributions and the initial seed size. We then establish the asymptotic limit for the
fraction of susceptible individuals. Moreover, we establish the basic reproduction number
of the epidemic R0 in the context of our model, defined as the expected number of links
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of those individuals infected by one initial seed. We show that R0 characterizes the spread
of epidemic in the usual way: If this is larger than one the epidemic, starting from small
initial infected individuals, is explosive, whereas if it is below one then the epidemic will
die out.
Our main results refer to the equilibrium of the social distancing game. All individuals
choose their strategies and, in equilibrium, the realized network immunity – determined
using our first set of results – must match the hypothesized network immunity. The space
of social activity levels is discretized, with zero representing (fully) social distancing and
the maximum given by a government imposed level. Individuals are assumed myopic: they
make short term decisions which have lifelong implications or even imply death. For clar-
ity, we think of the decision process as daily and of course, it suffices to scale our results
for weekly, monthly or other short term horizon one deems realistic for the individuals’
commitment to their social distancing strategy. Individuals derive short-term utility from
social activity, and we assume that this scales linearly with their number of contacts. This
is counteracted by the probability of contracting the disease (over the same time horizon),
multiplied by the type-specific death (or sequela) probability given infection. The prob-
ability of contracting the disease clearly depends on the individual rates of contacts and
on the aggregate decisions of everyone else, through the network immunity. We show that
there is at most one equilibrium, which can be given semi-analytically. For the case with
two possible decisions, to socially distance or not, and when the graph is regular, the social
utility averaged over the population has a particularly simple form. For the regular graph
case, we show that the voluntary social distancing will always lead to a lower average utility
than the social optimum, and this result holds irrespective of the functional dependence of
the death rate on network immunity. Put simply, even when people are in full recognition
of the impact on the heath system and health outcomes of having a large outbreak, their
decisions will have worse utility than the social optimum.
We then proceed to examine numerically the gap between the Laissez-Faire equilibrium
and social optimum for our model, calibrated to the Covid-19 current data. Several points
emerge from this study: As we increase the fraction of social contact in VSLY, all age
groups will practice less and less social distancing. However, for the youngest cohorts, the
rate of decrease is highest. This effect could only increase if the fraction of social contact
is non-constant across age groups and higher for the younger ones. Second, if individuals
overestimate network immunity (or the epidemic size is downplayed), then they will choose
higher levels of activity than if they had perfect knowledge of the state of the network
epidemic. In doing so, the epidemic becomes large.
We next investigate the utility gap between the social optimum and the voluntary social
distancing. We find that the gap is one magnitude more significant when the death rates
given infection depend on the global network immunity.
Related literature. Our work is part of the vast literature on SIR epidemics on random
networks, to name just a few [Ball and Sirl, 2016, Stegehuis et al., 2016, Janson et al., 2014,
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Pastor-Satorras et al., 2015, Ball et al., 2009, Kiss et al., 2017, Ball et al., 2010, Ball et al., 2014,
Barbour et al., 2013, Britton et al., 2007, Draief and Massouli, 2010]. We continue on the
same line as [Janson et al., 2014] who studies the SIR epidemics dynamics in the configura-
tion model. We partly extend his work (which on the other hand allows for time dynamics)
to allow for different individual types. Our proof also is quite different and we allow for
the more general class of epidemics represented by the independent threshold model with
differentiated types. This may be of interest in itself.
The second related strand of literature is on economics of information security for homo-
geneous networks, see e.g. [Gordon and Loeb, 2002, Lelarge, 2012a, Acemoglu et al., 2016]
and on games on network [Jackson, 2010, Jackson and Zenou, 2015]. In [Gordon and Loeb, 2002],
the authors consider a simple one-period economic model for a single individual who takes
into account a monetary loss should infection occur and a probability depending on se-
curity investment to become infected. The security investment choice is analogous to the
social distancing. [Lelarge, 2012a] gives a a sufficient condition for monotone investment
which guarantees that when network vulnerability is higher individuals invest more. We
make the equivalent assumption here that there is less social distancing when network im-
munity is higher. In particular, more closely related to our paper, [Acemoglu et al., 2016,
Lelarge, 2012a] analyze the network security game (strong versus weak protection) for con-
tact process in random networks. We generalize their results by allowing more social dis-
tancing levels, moreover type dependent.
Following the health emergency, several papers study the equilibrium social distanc-
ing for COVID-19, see e.g., [Acemoglu et al., 2020, Farboodi et al., 2020, Jones et al., 2020,
Ferguson et al., 2006, Ferguson et al., 2020, Del Valle et al., 2007, Prem et al., 2020, Miller et al., 2010,
Prem et al., 2017, Mossong et al., 2008, Toxvaerd, 2020]. Our paper is to our best knowl-
edge the first to allow for a network underlying social contacts and heterogeneity.
Outline. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide the modeling
framework for heterogeneous SIRD epidemics and state our main results regarding the final
outcome of the epidemic on given networks and random networks underlying the social
contacts. In Section 3 we consider the network social distancing game. In Section 4, we
illustrate how our model can be applied to the Covid-19 public health crisis and calibrate
the parameters. Section 5 concludes and the Appendix A contains all the proofs.
2 Models and final outcome of major outbreak
In this section we introduce the epidemic model and state the main results, for a given
individuals social distancing strategies profile across individuals, when contact takes place
on general networks and respectively on random networks with given vertex degrees.
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2.1 Heterogeneous SIRD epidemics
We consider a heterogeneous stochastic SIR epidemic process with a possibility of death,
i.e., a SIRD (Susceptible → Infectious → Recovered/Dead) model, which is a Markovian
model for spreading a disease or virus in a finite population. Our population is assumed to
interact via a network G(n). The set of nodes [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} represents individuals or
households, and the edges represent (potential) connections between individuals. Connec-
tions can stem from various sources, and the network is understood to aggregate all these
sources. Individuals susceptible to the epidemic may become infected through contact with
other infected neighboring individuals.
The population is heterogeneous, individuals can be of different types (e.g., age, sex,
blood type, etc.) in a certain type space T , large enough to classify all individuals to the
available information. We use the notations t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) to denote the type profiles
of all individuals.
Moreover, we consider a finite ensemble of social distancing strategies S = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,K},
with 0 representing complete isolation. We use the notations s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) and
s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) to denote the social distancing profiles of all individuals
and all individuals other than i respectively.
We assume that at time t = 0, all individuals have only partial information about the
network characteristics, the epidemic parameters and the initial conditions. An individual
of type t will get utility u
(s)
t by choosing social distancing strategy s ∈ S. The social
distancing equilibrium will be discussed in Section 3.
Let us denote by n
(s)
t the number of individuals of type t ∈ T with social distancing
strategy s ∈ S so that ∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
n
(s)
t = n.
It is understood that the network is parametrized by its size (and indeed all quantities
we define depend on n, which we leave out from the notation for simplicity). We seek to
understand the outcomes of a major outbreak as the size of the network becomes large.
The following condition is standard: for all t ∈ T and s ∈ S,
n
(s)
t
n
−→ µ(s)t as n→∞. (1)
We let µt :=
∑
s∈S µ
(s)
t be the (asymptotic) fraction of individuals with type t.
The initial condition of the epidemic is given by the set of initially infected individuals
I(0), the set of initially removed individuals R(0) and the set of susceptible individuals
S(0). The set of initially removed individuals could be interpreted as a set of immune or
non-susceptible individuals. In the later stages of the epidemic, the set of removed nodes
will grow with the recovered or dead individuals. Note that S(0) ∪ I(0) ∪ R(0) = [n] and
the initial conditions may also depend on the type of each individual.
Each infected individual, throughout its infection period, infects (makes infectious con-
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tact with) any susceptible neighbor individual with type t and social distancing strategy s
at the points of a Poisson process with rate β
(s)
t > 0. We assume there is no latent period
so that the contacted susceptible individuals are immediately infected and are able to infect
other individuals.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the infection time ρ is constant and, without
loss of generality, we scale the time to make the constant ρ = 1. The infected individual
with type t dies after time ρ with probability κt and recovers with probability 1−κt. Note
that if ρ 6= 1, it suffices to replace the infection rates β by ρβ.
We will allow in Section 3 the fatality probability to depend on the fraction (number)
of infected people during the epidemic process, as the hospital system can be overwhelmed.
In our baseline model an infected individual knows that he is infected and from this mo-
ment he is indifferent (the social activity doesn’t depend on type for infected individuals)
regarding his social activity. The assumption that the infection rate depends only on the
type and strategy of the susceptible party is implicitly assuming a conservative setting in
which the effort to avoid infection comes from the susceptibles. One could make additional
assumptions on the infectives, on whom we could impose quarantine or we could model
additional elements in their utility functions to entail concern for their family and friends.
Here we leave these considerations aside, in order to focus on the individual’s decision when
the utility includes only her own value of life.
We also assume that the recovered individuals are no longer infectious, and moreover
immune to further infections. Note that this remains a point of active research for Covid-
19. The epidemic process continues until there are no infective individuals present in the
population. Each alive individual is then either still susceptible, or else they have been
infected and have recovered.
We assume that there are initially nS , nI and nR susceptible, infective and removed
(recovered or dead) individuals, respectively. Moreover, for each type t ∈ T , there are
respectively nS,t, nI,t and nR,t of these individuals with type t. Hence, we have |S(0)| =
nS , |I(0)| = nI , |R(0)| = nR,
nS =
∑
t∈T
nS,t, nI =
∑
t∈T
nI,t, nR =
∑
t∈T
nR,t and nS + nI + nR = n.
We are then interested in S(s)(∞) and R(s)(∞) the final set of susceptible and removed
individuals, respectively, when the individuals follow the social distancing strategy s. Sim-
ilarly, S(s)t,d (∞) denotes the final set of susceptible individuals with type t, degree d and
social distancing strategy s.
2.2 Bounds in general networks
In this section we state some general conditions on the adjacency matrix of the interaction
graph and epidemics parameters for the size of the epidemics to be small compared to the
size of the network.
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Let A denote the adjacency matrix of the social contact graph. The probability that an
infected individual makes infectious contact with any susceptible neighbor with type t and
social activity s is given by 1− e−β(s)t . Given the social distancing profile s, we define the
infection matrix B(s) as
B
(s)
ij :=
(
1− e−β
(sj)
tj
)
Aij , (2)
for all i, j ∈ [n]. Note that the infection rates are not necessarily symmetric and, in general,
the matrix B(s) might not be symmetric even (if) the adjacency matrix A is symmetric.
We first give a condition on the maximum row sum of the matrix B, which gives us an up-
per bound for the expected amplification of infected individuals (|R(s)(∞)|−|R(0)|)/|I(0)|.
The set of removed nodes at infinity R(s)(∞) \ R(0) is the set of recovered or dead
during the epidemic and is same set of all individuals who have ever been infected starting
from the initial seed.
Proposition 2.1. Let B
(s)
i =
∑n
j=1B
(s)
ij and B
(s)
max = maxi(B
(s)
i ). If B
(s)
max < 1, then
E[|R(s)(∞)|] ≤ |R(0)|+ 1
1−B(s)max
|I(0)|, (3)
which in particular implies that for all k > 0,
P
(
|R(s)(∞)| − |R(0)| ≥ k
1−B(s)max
|I(0)|
)
≤ 1
k
.
We now consider the L2 norm of the matrix B. Let λmax(B) = ||B||2 be the largest
singular value of B, which is the square root of the largest eigenvalue of the positive-
semidefinite matrix BTB. The following proposition shows that the expected amplification
is O(
√
n) whenever the largest singular value is smaller than 1.
Proposition 2.2. If λmax(B
(s)) < 1, then
E[|R(s)(∞)|] ≤ |R(0)|+ 1
1− λmax(B(s))
√
n|I(0)|, (4)
which in particular implies that for all k > 0,
P
(
|R(s)(∞)| − |R(0)| ≥ k
1− λmax(B(s))
√
n|I(0)|
)
≤ 1
k
.
2.3 Random networks with fixed degrees
For n ∈ N, let d(n) = (di)ni=1 be a sequence of non-negative integers such that
∑n
i=1 di
is even. We now consider a configuration model for the underlying network. We endow
the set of individuals [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} with a sequence of degrees d(n). We define a
random multigraph with given degree sequence (di)
n
1 as follows. To each node i, we asso-
ciate di labeled half-edges. All half-edges need to be paired to construct the graph, this
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is done by randomly matching them. When a half-edge of a node i is paired with a half-
edge of a node j, we interpret this as an edge between i and j. We denote the resulting
random graph by G(n) and we write (i, j) ∈ G(n) for the event that there is an edge be-
tween i and j. It is easy to see that conditional on the multigraph being simple graph,
we obtain a uniformly distributed random graph with these given degree sequences; see
e.g. [van der Hofstad, 2016, Durrett, 2007].
We consider asymptotics as n → ∞ for the SIRD model on the configuration model.
In the remainder of the paper we will use the notation op and
p−→ in a standard way. Let
{Xn}n∈U be a sequence of real-valued random variables on a probability space (Ω,P). If
c ∈ R is a constant, we write Xn p−→ c to denote that Xn converges in probability to c. That
is, for any  > 0, we have P(|Xn−c| > )→ 0 as n→∞. Let {an}n∈N be a sequence of real
numbers that tends to infinity as n → ∞. We write Xn = op(an), if |Xn|/an converges to
0 in probability. If En is a measurable subset of Ω, for any n ∈ N, we say that the sequence
{En}n∈N occurs with high probability (w.h.p.) if P(En) = 1− o(1), as n→∞.
We assume that there are initially n
(s)
S,t,d susceptible individuals with social distancing
strategy s ∈ S, type t ∈ T and degree d ∈ N. Further, there are nI,d and nR,d infective and
recovered individuals with degree d ∈ N, respectively. Hence, we have
nS =
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
n
(s)
S,t,d, nI =
∞∑
d=0
nI,d, nR =
∞∑
d=0
nR,d,
and nS + nI + nR = n.
For the initially infected or removed individuals we do not need to know their distribution
across types, and only their total number of links (infected linkages) matters for the epidemic
dynamics. We only need to know that their initial fraction of converge as the network
becomes large. Similarly, we need convergence of the fraction of infected linkages. The
type, degree and social distancing strategy distribution only matters for the susceptible
individuals.
We now describe the regularity assumptions on individual degrees under individuals type
profile t(n) = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) and social distancing strategy profile s
(n) = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) .
We assume that the sequence (s, t,d) and the set of initially susceptible, infective and
recovered individuals satisfies the following regularity conditions:
(C1) The fractions of initially susceptible, infective and recovered vertices converge to some
αS , αI , αR ∈ (0, 1), i.e.
nS/n→ αS , nI/n→ αI , nR/n→ αR. (5)
Moreover, αS > 0.
(C2) The degree, type and social distancing strategy of a randomly chosen susceptible
individual converges to
n
(s)
S,t,d/nS → µ(s)t,d , (6)
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for some probability distribution
(
µ
(s)
t,d
)
s∈S,t∈T ,d∈N
. Moreover, this limiting distribu-
tion has a finite and positive mean
µS :=
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
dµ
(s)
t,d ∈ (0,∞),
and the average degree of a randomly chosen susceptible individual converges to µS
as n→∞, i.e. ∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
dn
(s)
S,t,d/nS → µS . (7)
(C3) The average degree over all individuals converges to some λ ∈ (0,∞), i.e. as n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
di → λ, (8)
and, in more detail, for some λS , λI , λR, the average degrees over susceptible, infective
and recovered individuals converge:
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
dn
(s)
S,t,d/n→ λS ,
∞∑
d=0
dnI,d/n→ λI ,
∞∑
d=0
dnR,d/n→ λR. (9)
(C4) The maximum degree of all individuals is not too large:
dmax = max{di : i = 1, . . . , n} = o(n). (10)
Our first theorem concerns the case where λI > 0 and the initially infective population
is macroscopic:
Theorem 2.3. Suppose that (C1)− (C4) hold and λI > 0. Then there is a unique solution
x
(s)
∗ ∈ (0, 1) to the fixed point equation x = f (s)(x), where
f (s)(x) :=
λR
λ
+ αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
dµ
(s)
t,d
λ
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d−1
. (11)
Moreover, the final fraction (probability) of susceptible nodes with degree d ∈ N, type t ∈ T
and social distancing strategy s ∈ S satisfies:
|S(s)t,d (∞)|
n
(s)
S,t,d
p−→
(
x
(s)
∗ +
(
1− x(s)∗
)
e−β
(s)
t
)d
. (12)
We can interpret x
(s)
∗ as the probability that a neighbor of a randomly chosen susceptible
individual does not get infected during the epidemic. The intuition behind equation (11)
is the following: either that neighbor is recovered, with probability given by the first term
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λR
λ or she is susceptible. In the latter case she has degree d and strategy s with probability
proportional to the number of links of these nodes:
dn
(s)
S,t,d
λSn
which converges to αS
dµ
(s)
t,d
λ as
n goes to infinity. To be consistent with the susceptible status of this neighbour, it must
be that all its other d − 1 neighbors are susceptible (with probability x(s)∗ ) or they were
removed before interaction (with probability (1− x(s)∗ )e−β
(s)
t ).
The same intuition applies to (12). To be consistent with the susceptible status of an
individual of degree d, type t and strategy s, it must be that all its d neighbors are either
susceptible (with probability x
(s)
∗ ) or they were removed before interaction (with probability
(1− x(s)∗ )e−β
(s)
t ).
Our next theorem concerns the case with initially few infective individual, i.e. |I(0)| =
o(n) and λI = 0. Let
R
(s)
0 :=
(αS
λ
)∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
(
1− e−β(s)t
) ∞∑
d=0
d(d− 1)µ(s)t,d . (13)
This quantity represents the expected number of infective links in the second generation
of the epidemic, i.e., the number of linkages of those infected by the initial seed (other than
the link from the initial seed). It is these linkages that could propagate the epidemic. Sus-
ceptible individuals are reached by the initial seed according to the size biased distribution
αS
dµ
(s)
t,d
λ that we have seen above, and they are infected with probability 1 − e−β
(s)
t . In
fact, when the initial fraction of susceptible individuals is macroscopic, R
(s)
0 characterizes
not only the second generation of the epidemic, but every generation in the initial stages
of the epidemic. Initially, the contagion process behaves like a branching process, which
could either die out or explode. The following theorem states that if R
(s)
0 is below 1 then
the epidemic will die out and otherwise a positive fraction of the population will become
infected.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose that (C1)− (C4) hold and λI = αI = 0. The followings hold:
(i) If R
(s)
0 < 1, then the number of susceptible individuals that ever get infected is op(n).
(ii) If R
(s)
0 > 1, , then there exists δ > 0 such that at least δn susceptible individuals get
infected with probability bounded away zero.
We end this section by the following remark. Our results in this paper are all stated
for the random multigraph G(n). However, they could be transferred by conditioning
on the multigraph being a simple graph (without loop and multiples edges). The re-
sulting random graph, denoted by G(n)∗ , will be uniformly distributed among all graphs
with the same degrees sequence. In order to transfer the results, we would need (see
e.g., [Janson et al., 2014]) to assume that the degree distribution has a finite second mo-
ment, i.e. ∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d2µ
(s)
t,d ∈ (0,∞),
which from [Janson, 2009b] implies that the probability that G(n) is simple being bounded
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away from zero as n→∞. Moreoer, as this is also stated in [Janson et al., 2014], we suspect
that all results hold even without the second moment assumption. [Bolloba´s and Riordan, 2015]
have recently shown results for the size of the giant component in G(n)∗ from the multigraph
case without using the second moment assumption; they prove that even with the small
probability that the multigraph is simple, the error probabilities are even smaller.
2.4 Vaccination
We now consider heterogeneous SIRD epidemics in percolated random graph G(n) where
we first generate the random graph G(n) (by the configuration model) and then vaccinate
(remove) individuals at random. Given a probability function ω : T × N → [0, 1], let G(n)ω
denote the random graph obtained by randomly and independently deleting each individual
of type t ∈ T and degree d ∈ N with probability ωt,d. In particular (as an example), for
edge-wise vaccination, one vaccinates the end point of each susceptible half edge with some
fixed probability ν independently of all the other half-edges. Thus the probability that a
degree d susceptible individual is vaccinated will be ωt,d = 1− (1− ν)d.
Note that in the case where the social planner does not have information on the types
and degrees, degree vaccination, where we vaccinate the nodes with highest degrees, is not
possible. Edge-based vaccination is more beneficial compared to random vaccination (see
e.g. [Ball and Sirl, 2016, Janson et al., 2014]).
In general, the total number of individuals vaccinated will satisfy
V/nS
p−→
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
ωt,dµ
(s)
t,d . (14)
Since vaccinating an individual would be equivalent to changing its type from susceptible
to recovered, our results apply to the number of infected individual after vaccination:
Theorem 2.5. Consider heterogeneous SIRD epidemics in percolated (vaccinated) random
graph G(n). Suppose that (C1) − (C4) hold. Suppose further that each initially susceptible
individual with type t ∈ T and degree k ∈ N is vaccinated with probability ωt,d ∈ [0, 1)
independently of the others, and let λI = αI = 0. Let
R(s)ω :=
(αS
λ
)∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
(
1− e−β(s)t
) ∞∑
d=0
d(d− 1)µ(s)t,d(1− ωt,d). (15)
The following hold:
(i) If R
(s)
ω < 1, then the number of susceptible individuals that ever get infected is op(n).
(ii) If R
(s)
ω > 1, then there exists δ > 0 such that at least δn susceptible individuals get
infected with probability bounded away zero.
This theorem can be obtain as a corollary of theorem 2.4. Indeed, it suffices to augment
the set of removed nodes by the set of vaccinated nodes. The assumptions (C1)− (C4) hold
with high probability with the new distribution for the susceptible nodes ωt,d
(
1− µ(s)t,d
)
.
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3 Equilibrium social distancing
In this section we introduce the social distancing game and analyse its equilibrium.
3.1 The model
We now consider a network social distancing game in presence of an epidemic risk. We
assume that individual i can decide on social activity level s ∈ S := {0, 1, . . . ,K} for a
payoff pi
(s)
i = pi
(s)
ti,di
, and faces a potential loss `i in case it becomes infected. Clearly,
deciding in a higher social activity increases the payoff, i.e., pi
(s)
i is strictly increasing in s.
However,
0 = β
(0)
t < β
(1)
t < · · · < β(K)t ≤ 1. (16)
Further, in our baseline model, the government itself might imposes a maximum level of
activity Kg, so the activity space is Sg. For example, all effective strategies will be capped
by a level Kg and the strategy becomes s ∧Kg.
The timeline is as follows: individuals learn their potential loss in case they become in-
fected. This is private information, but the distribution of (type-dependent) losses, denoted
by Ft, is common knowledge. Individuals then decide on their social activity level. We as-
sume that at time t = 0, all individuals have only partial information about the network.
Namely, they do not observe who is connected to whom. The degree-type and epidemic
parameter β
(s)
t are common knowledge. Similarly, they do not know the exact nodes that
are initially infected, but only their (asymptotic) fraction.
In the network of size n, we write the utility of (susceptible) node i as
ui(`, s) = ui(`1, ..., `n, s1, ..., sn) := pi
(si)
ti,di
− `iκtiPn(i ∈ I(s)(∞)), (17)
where I(s)(∞) = R(s)(∞)/R(0) denotes the final set of all cumulative infection starting
from initial infected seed I0 and Pn(i ∈ I(s)(∞)) is over the distribution of the random
graph G(n) of size n, given all nodes’ degrees, losses and social activity vector s. As in
[Farboodi et al., 2020], we capture the risk of loosing life or becoming ill together by a
single function κ. We refer to κti as the fatality probability for an infected individual.
Given the loss of life or illness, there is a random loss denoted by `i, whose distribution
might depend on ti.
We say that a social activity across susceptible individuals s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, . . . , s
∗
n) is a
(pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium if
s∗i ∈ arg max
s∈S
ui(`1, ..., `n, s
∗
1, ...s
∗
i−1, s, s
∗
i+1, ..., s
∗
n), (18)
for all i ∈ [n].
Similarly, a social activity profile s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, . . . , s
∗
n) is a social optimum if for all
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s ∈ Sn,
n∑
i=1
ui(`, s
∗) ≥
n∑
i=1
ui(`, s).
We call parameter x∗ the global network immunity, because it represents the probability
that a susceptible neighbor of a randomly chosen node does not get infected. Then, for a
given random network with immunity x, a representative susceptible individual with type t,
degree d and social activity s will get infected and face losses ` with (asymptotic) probability
(see Theorem 2.3)
κt(x)
(
1−
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d)
.
An individual of type t and degree d will get utility u
(s)
t,d(x) by choosing social distancing
strategy s ∈ S. More precisely, her utility is decomposed into the utility from activity,
denoted by pi
(s)
t,d and a cost of life loss or path to recovery modeled by a loss random variable
` (following distribution Ft) and fatality probability κt. We also assume that κt = κt(x∗)
depends on network immunity x∗. This captures the fact that recovery is impacted by the
performance of the health system, which in turn depends on the network immunity and
the size of infected population. Note that the utility from social activity depends on the
choice of the susceptible individual and also on the overall fraction of individuals choosing
to interact.
Given the global network immunity x ∈ [0, 1], the (representative) individual with type
t and degree d maximization problem is thus
s∗t,d := arg max
s∈S
pi
(s)
t,d − `κt(x)
(
1−
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d)
. (19)
This can be interpreted as an asymptotic Nash equilibrium when the global network
immunity x summarizes the impact of all individuals optimal social activity levels s∗t,d. This
is a fixed point problem that will be described in the following. Indeed, this is an asymptotic
Nash equilibrium because under partial information the limit of Pn(i ∈ I(s)(∞)) in (17)
depends on the strategies of all other players only through the global network immunity.
Therefore, the strategy of each individual will be given by the strategy of the representative
individual of her degree and type.
In particular, given global network immunity x, the representative individual prefers the
social activity level s over higher social activity level s+ 1 if and only if
`κt(x)
((
x+ (1− x)e−β(s+1)t
)d
−
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d)
> pi
(s)
t,d − pi(s+1)t,d . (20)
Let us define for s = 0, 1, . . . ,K − 1, the threshold loss functions
`
(s)
t,d(x) :=
pi
(s+1)
t,d − pi(s)t,d
κt(x)
((
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d
−
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s+1)t
)d) . (21)
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Note that `
(s)
t,d(x) > 0 for x ∈ (0, 1) since pi(s)t,d and β(s)t are strictly increasing in s and
x ∈ (0, 1) makes the denominator positive.
Hence, the representative individual prefers the social activity level s over higher social
activity level s+1 if and only if ` > `
(s)
t,d(x). In other words, since the loss function ` follows
distribution Ft, the fraction of susceptible individuals with type t and degree d which prefer
social activity s+ 1 over s is given by Ft
(
`
(s)
t,d(x)
)
.
(A1) We assume in the following that `
(s)
t,d(x) is a decreasing function of s, i.e., for all
d ∈ N, t ∈ T , x ∈ [0, 1],
`
(0)
t,d (x) > `
(1)
t,d (x) > · · · > `(K−1)t,d (x). (22)
Note that the above assumption is only needed if there are more than two social activity
levels, i.e. K > 2. Under this condition, the optimal individual’s social activity is threshold-
type: follow the social activity level s if and only if ` ∈ (`(s)t,d(x), `(s−1)t,d (x)] (set `(−1)t,d (x) =∞).
(A2) We assume in the following that `
(s)
t,d(x) is an increasing function of x, i.e.
κt(x)
((
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d
−
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s+1)t
)d)
is (strictly) decreasing in x.
The first assumption states that the level of loss where individuals choose to socially
isolate is higher than the level of loss where individuals choose activity level 1, and so on
for the higher activity levels. The second assumption states that the level of loss where
individuals choose to socially isolate is higher when the network immunity is higher. Same
holds for all levels of activity. The less the global network immunity, the more susceptible
individuals follow social distancing.
3.2 Asymptotic Nash equilibrium analysis
We are now ready to describe the asymptotic Nash equilibrium as a fixed point problem.
In the previous section we described the representative individuals’ choice given the global
network immunity.
Let xe denote the expected global immunity in the random network (expected ratio of
infected edges among all the edges). Hence, the representative individual with degree d and
type t would choose social activity level s if and only if
`
(s)
t,d(xe) < ` ≤ `(s−1)t,d (xe).
So the fraction of individuals with degree d, type t and following social activity level
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s = 0, 1, . . . ,K would be γ¯
(s)
t,d = γ
(s)
t,d (xe), where
γ¯
(s)
t,d = Ft
(
`
(s−1)
t,d (xe)
)
− Ft
(
`
(s)
t,d(xe)
)
(23)
and we set Ft(`
(−1)) = Ft(∞) = 1. So we have
µ
(s)
t,d(xe) = µt,dγ¯
(s)
t,d .
On the other hand, given the probability distributions γ¯ : T × N → P(S), following
Theorem 2.3, a node i with type t and degree d will choose social activity s ∈ S as long as
`
(s)
t,d(x
γ¯
∗) < `i ≤ `(s−1)t,d (xγ¯∗),
where xγ¯∗ is the smallest fixed point in (0, 1) of x = f γ¯(x), with
f γ¯(x) :=
λR
λ
+ αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d
λ
µt,dγ¯
(s)
t,d
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d−1
. (24)
Hence, the actual fraction of individuals with type t and degree d following social activity
s ∈ S is given by γ(s)t,d = γ(s)t,d (xγ¯∗) where
γ
(s)
t,d = Ft
(
`
(s−1)
t,d (x
γ¯
∗)
)
− Ft
(
`
(s)
t,d(x
γ¯
∗)
)
. (25)
Following the above analysis, for any z ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ T , d ∈ N and s ∈ S, we define
fγ(z)(x) :=
λR
λ
+ αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d
λ
µt,dγ
(s)
t,d (z)
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d−1
, (26)
where we set
γ
(s)
t,d (z) = Ft
(
`
(s−1)
t,d (z)
)
− Ft
(
`
(s)
t,d(z)
)
. (27)
In the following theorem, we show the uniqueness of (asymptotic) Nash equilibrium for
the social distancing game.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a random graph G(n)n satisfying (C1)− (C4). Assume that (A1)−
(A2) holds. We have at most one equilibrium, which is given by the solution of the following
equation:
z = inf
x∈[0,1]
{x : fγ(z)(x) = x}. (28)
The proof of above theorem is provided in Section A.5.
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3.3 The effect of isolation
In this section, we assume S = {0, 1} and consider the (extreme) case where a susceptible
individual following social distancing s = 0 isolates and cannot get infected at all, i.e.,
β
(0)
t = 0 and β
(1)
t = βt for all t ∈ T . Namely, si = 1 if node i does not quarantine
and si = 0 if node i quarantines and isolate from the network. Hence, given the network
(expected) global immunity x and setting pit,d = pi
(1)
t,d − pi(0)t,d , a susceptible individual i with
type t and degree d will quarantine (isolate) from the network if and only if
`i > `t,d(x) :=
pit,d
κt(x)
(
1− (x+ (1− x)e−βt)d
) . (29)
In this case, all individuals following the quarantine can be removed from the network
and the epidemic goes through all other individuals. This is also equivalent to the individual
vaccination (site percolation) model. Let γt,d denote the fraction of susceptible individuals
(in equilibrium) with type t and degree d following quarantine.
Hence, in this case (A1)−(A2) are automatically verified and the equilibrium fixed point
equations (26)-(27) can be simplified to:
γt,d = 1− Ft
( pit,d
κt(x
γ
∗)
(
1− (xγ∗ + (1− xγ∗)e−βt)d
)), (30)
where xγ∗ is the smallest fixed point in [0, 1] of equation
fγ(x) :=
λR
λ
+ αS
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d
λ
µt,d
[
γt,d + (1− γt,d)
(
x+ (1− x)e−βt)d−1] . (31)
In Section 4 we will investigate the solution to this equation and give the application to
Covid-19 for various network parameters. Let us assume pi
(0)
t,d = 0 (“no joy in isolation”).
In this case, the social utility averaged over the population converges to
1
n
n∑
i=1
ui(`, s)
p−→ u¯social(γ) :=
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
µt,du¯t,d(γ),
with
u¯t,d(γ) := pit,d(1− γt,d)− κt(xγ∗)
(
1− (xγ∗ + (1− xγ∗)e−βt)d)∫ 1
γ
F−1t (1− u)du (32)
where, for individuals with type t and degree d, pit,d(1− γt,d) is the total payoff from social
activity and κt(x
γ
∗)
∫ 1
γ
F−1t (1 − u)du is the average loss faced by the (1 − γt,d)-fraction of
individuals who are not following isolation and therefore are subject to epidemic risk.
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3.4 Social optimum for regular homogeneous networks
In this section, we consider the previous isolation setup in the case of random regular graphs,
where di = d and ti = t for all nodes i ∈ [n]. Hence, µt,d = 1, λ = d, λR = αRd, and we
simplify the notations to κt = κ, βt = β, pit,d = pi and Ft = F . We use the value at risk
notation for the loss distribution
VaR1−γ(L) = F−1(1− γ) = − inf{` ∈ R : F (`) > 1− γ},
which represents the minimum amount of loss in 100(1 − γ)% worst-case scenarios. The
equilibrium fixed point equations are simplified to
VaR1−γ(L) =
pi
κ(xγ∗)
(
1− (xγ∗ + (1− xγ∗)e−β)d
) , (33)
where xγ∗ is the smallest fixed point in [0, 1] of equation
fγ(x) :=αR + αS
[
γ + (1− γ) (x+ (1− x)e−β)d−1] . (34)
Let us assume again pi(0) = 0 and pi(1) = pi. The social utility averaged over the population
converges to
1
n
n∑
i=1
ui(`, s)
p−→ u¯s(γ) :=pi(1− γ)− κ(xγ∗)
(
1− (xγ∗ + (1− xγ∗)e−β)d)∫ 1
γ
VaR1−u(L)du
where pi(1 − γ) is the total payoff from social activity and κ(xγ∗)
∫ 1
γ
VaR1−u(L)du is the
average loss faced by the (1− γ)-fraction of individuals who are not following isolation and
therefore are subject to epidemic risk.
The following theorem compares the fraction of self-isolating individuals in the voluntary
social distancing equilibrium and the optimum reached by a social planner.
Theorem 3.2. The social planner will choose a larger fraction γ of individuals following
isolation than the market equilibrium for any fixed payoff pi and fatality rate function κ.
Figure 1a varies the link payoff pi (this derives the gain form social participation and in
the numerical calibration will be taken to equal the value of statistical life). As the network
immunity fixed point solution decreases, the final fraction of infected individuals decreases.
This is intuitive: all else fixed, as the link payoff becomes larger, less people choose to
socially distance and this results into a large scale epidemic. Note the gap between the
fraction of individuals who self-isolate in equilibrium versus the social optimum.
In Figures 1b-1c individuals may (1%) overestimate the network immunity as they com-
pute their optimal decision. We plot the final fraction of infected individuals and individuals
choosing to self isolate when they have perfect observation of the global network immunity
versus when they overestimate the network immunity. Under over-estimation, a lower frac-
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1: Equilibrium solutions for regular homogeneous networks: Here d = 10, αR =
0, αI = 0.05, αS = 0.95, β = 0.4, κ(x) = 0.1/(1 +x)
3 and L follows half-normal distribution
L ∼ HN(0, 100) with density function f(`;σ) =
√
2
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− `22σ2
)
for ` ≥ 0 and σ = 100.
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tion self-isolate and the infection rates are higher. The difference between the two cases can
be seen as a value of information that allows people to optimally choose social distancing.
Even when payoffs from the linkages are low, an error on the estimated network risk can
lead to a large scale epidemics. Remark that around pi = 0, and when the immunity is
equal to 1, a small fraction of individuals can choose not to self isolate because their impact
on overall immunity is small enough and with their over-estimation error, they still believe
that the network is fully immune. Indeed, in the case when pi = 0 and expected network
immunity is one, because all individuals are indifferent, there are infinitely many equilibria.
This marks the beginning of the epidemic.
Figure 2 shows that, as expected, R0 is larger in the voluntary social distancing equi-
librium (Laissez-Faire equilibrium). We note a strong dependence of the vaccination needs
(in order to bring R0 below 1) on the link payoff.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: (a) R0 in voluntary social distancing equilibrium versus social optimum policy
and (b) heat map for R0 with vaccination. Here d = 10, αR = 0, αI = 0.05, αS = 0.95, β =
0.4, κ(x) = 0.1/(1 + x)3 and L follows half-normal distribution L ∼ HN(0, 100).
4 Covid-19 numerical example
In this section we illustrate how our model can be applied to the Covid-19 public health
crisis, to model for example a policy response without a strict lockdown, as for example
in Sweden or some U.S. states where lockdowns were released early. Note that our vol-
untary social distancing equilibrium is one in which the population is fully informed or
the global contagion probability and decides to socially distance according to their util-
ity. To assess the equilibrium choice in realistic settings we set the parameters of the
model to Covid-19 data. In reality, there is enormous uncertainty around the estimation
of these parameters and in particular of the infection fatality ratios relevant to our model;
20
Age group Infection fatality ratio
20 - 29 0.0600%
30 - 39 0.146%
40 - 49 0.295%
50 - 59 1.25%
60 - 69 3.99%
70 - 79 8.61%
≥ 80 13.4%
Table 1: Infection fatality ratio across ages [Verity et al., 2020].
e.g., see [Manski and Molinari, 2020]. We follow the estimates in [Flaxman et al., 2020,
Verity et al., 2020], based on case report data and aggregate case and death counts from
mainland China, from Hong Kong and Macau, and international case reports. These are
age-stratified and reproduced in Table 1. We focus on adults, over 20 years old, and study
their social distancing decisions. It remains contentious whether children or very young
adults act as spreaders. For simplicity, we exclude them, but they can be included as an
exogenous fraction of the population with prescribed behavior. The reason why they would
be exogenous is that we cannot expect the same decision making process as for adults, and
we would have to prescribe their behaviour.
Following other studies on Covid-19 and its various policy analyses [Greenstone and Nigam, 2020],
we use the U.S. Government value of a statistical life, age-adjusted, [Murphy and Topel, 2006,
Aldy and Viscusi, 2008, Aldy and Viscusi, 2007]. The idea is to define based on the amount
of U.S. dollars that one individual would pay in order to decrease her death probability by
0.1%. This gives a variety of ways to put an amount of utility units for the “inestimable
life”, and this is how much the individual values her own life rather than output estimates.
For example, how much would one invest in safety car features would go into this direction:
“Valuation of a statistical life is concerned with valuation of changes in the level of risk ex-
posure rather than the valuation of the life of a specific individual” [de Blaeij et al., 2003].
Note that for the individual decision in our model, the exact VSL is not relevant, but only
the change across age groups. Since the VSL encompasses all elements of life utility to
a person, then we set pi to be a fraction of value of year of statistical life. This fraction,
for which we will have a free parameter, represents the part of the VSL that is due to
interactions with other people and participation in social life. The following table gives
VSL across age groups, assuming $ 6.3 Million statistical life [Murphy and Topel, 2006]. In
exercises where the social utility needs to be reported, we will scale the results by 1.5 to the
more current (in 2017 U.S. Dollars) VSL of $ 10 Million assumed by the U.S. Government,
see [Kniesner and Viscusi, 2019]. Note that assuming that VSL is exogenous, even if we
use U.S. Government values, has its limits. VSL does include the economic component,
which is impacted by social distancing. It is beyond the scope of our model to capture the
economic impact of social distancing.
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Age group Value of statistical life Remaining life expectancy Value of yearly statistical life
20 - 29 6.8 54.5 0.25
30 - 39 7 45 0.28
40 - 49 6.7 36 0.30
50 - 59 5 27 0.27
60 - 69 4 19 0.28
70 - 79 3 12 0.30
≥ 80 1 6 0.18
Table 2: Value of statistical life at different ages in $ Million, assuming $6.3 Million
statistical life, based on [Murphy and Topel, 2006].
In order to compute the yearly value of statistical life, we set an interest rate r = 3%
and we put VSLY = rVSL
1−(1+r)−L , where L is the remaining life expectancy. As Table 2 shows,
VSLY is not constant across age groups and VSL has a non-monotonous shape with a peak
in the 30− 39 age group.
For simplicity, we have aggregated across gender and the remaining life expectancy
represents an average. We have 7 types in the model, represented by the age groups, as this
is the primary factor driving the fatality rates reported in Table 1. As more information is
learned on Covid-19, the types can be made more granular.
We consider two social distancing level levels, S = {0, 1}.
The yearly value of a statistical life, which we denote VSLYt is the basis for calibration
of the payoff pi
(s)
i = pi
(s)
t,d . Namely, we set a free parameter ι, called value of social contact.
The part 1− ι represents the fraction of her yearly value of a statistical life independent on
social contact. The part ι that is dependent of social contact is assumed to scale linearly
with the number of contacts. Namely, we set the daily gain as
pi
(s)
t,d =
1
365
∗
(1− ι)VSLYt + ιVSLYtλ d for s = 1,(1− ι)VSLYt for s = 0. (35)
For the loss distribution of type t we choose the lognormal distribution, with type-
dependent mean parameter mt and constant standard deviation σ, i.e. with density function
f(`;mt, σ) =
1
`σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− log(`)−mt2σ2
)
, such that the mean satisfies
exp
(
mt +
σ2
2
)
= VSLt, (36)
where we set σ = 3.
Recall that in our model, real time is replaced by interaction time. The relevant quantity
is the probability that the constant recovery is longer than the exponential between the
arrivals of the Poisson process driving interactions. The other implicit notion of time comes
in the decision of the individuals: they balance the risk of loss of life against the short term
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Age group Population distribution Mean (Standard deviation) for number of potential contacts
20 - 29 0.147 % 13.57 (10.60)
30 - 39 0.179% 14.14 (10.15)
40 - 49 0.177% 13.83 (10.86)
50 - 59 0.178% 12.30 (10.23)
60 - 69 0.154% 9.21 (7.96)
70 - 79 0.099% 8.05 (6.895)
≥ 80 0.066% 6.89 (5.83)
Table 3: Population distribution (conditional on age greater than 20) by age group (Source:
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World
Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision); Average number of daily contacts in European
countries provided by [Mossong et al., 2008] .
effects of social distancing. The short term horizon is fixed, assumed to be one day (and
with scaling any fixed term horizon). It would be interesting to the short term horizon
random, driven for example by the arrival of a cure and the individuals’ beliefs over its
timing.
Recall that in our analysis, we assumed that the infection time ρ is constant and equal
(normalized) to 1. The infected individual with type t dies after time ρ with probability
κt and recovers with probability 1− κt. The fatality probabilities given infection are given
in table 1. Since the infection time ρ 6= 1, we replace the infection rates β by ρβ. As
in [Alvarez et al., 2020], we set ρ = 18 reflecting that on average the illness lasts for 18
days. Consistent with estimates in the literature of the average number of people who
will contact an infected person R0 ≈ 4, see [Ferguson et al., 2020], we set β such that the
infected individual has on average 4 contaminations, i.e., we set
λ
(
1− e−ρβ) = 4 =⇒ ρβ¯ = − log(1− 4/λ)
and we leave the distribution of β across types free, such that its average matches β¯.
We will take the degree distribution as power law (Pareto) distribution, with a different
shape and scale parameters for each type. Namely, we set
µt,d/µt ∼ Ctd−(αt+1) for d ≥ δt (37)
where αt is the shape parameter for type t and δt is the scale parameter (minimum degree)
for type t and Ct is the normalization constant for type t. We calibrate this distribution to
have the mean m̂t and variance σ̂
2
t given in Table 3, i.e.,
m̂t ≈ αtδt
αt − 1 and σ̂
2
t ≈
αtδ
2
t
(αt − 1)(αt − 2) . (38)
In figure 3 we plot the fraction of individuals who voluntary self-isolate in equilibrium
for varying levels of the parameter ι and across age groups. As the social contact as a
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Figure 3: Voluntary social distancing equilibrium fraction of individuals following isolation
by varying the social contact parameter ι: Here αR = 0, αI = 0.1, αS = 0.9 and κt(x) = κt
as in Table 1.
promotion of value of statistical life increases, and all the rest constant, less people practice
social distancing. This is true for all age groups, but the decrease is much more significant
for the younger age groups.
We next plot in Figure 4 the fraction of individuals socially distancing, as a function of
their hypothesized network immunity. In this exercise, the mortality rates are independent
of the epidemic. In green is the equilibrium network immunity, so one can easily read the
fractions who socially distance for each age group, ranging from 25% among the 20 − 29
to 73 in the +80 age group. This is close to the social optimum, which results in higher
network immunity. Figure 5 illustrates the gap in utility between the social optimum and
the voluntary social distancing equilibrium. The utility is expressed in 1.5 million $ / year
(accounting for the 1.5 factor, see Table 2). The highest gains are for the 30− 39, 40− 49
and 70− 79.
In the next set of results, illustrated in Figures 6 and 7, we repeat the previous exercise,
but with survival rates decreasing as the network immunity decreases, and for example the
healthcare system is overwhelmed. The absolute gains in utility are one magnitude larger
than before, with the highest absolute gains for the younger cohorts. The equilibrium
network immunity is significantly different. However, the relative utility gains are highest
for the oldest.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4: (a) Voluntary social distancing equilibrium vs. (b) Social optimal policy fraction
of individuals following isolation as a function of expected network immunity: Here αR =
0, αI = 0.1, αS = 0.9, ι = 0.5 and κt(x) = κt as in Table 1.
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(a)
(b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5: (a) Voluntary social distancing vs. (b) Social optimal policy average utility
(expressed in $1.5 Million/year) as a function of expected network immunity: Here αR =
0, αI = 0.1, αS = 0.9, ι = 0.5 and κt(x) = κt given in Table 1. (c) The average utility
gain vs. (d) relative utility gain for a representative individual by following social optimal
policy vs. voluntary social distancing over different age groups.
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(a)
(b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6: (a) Voluntary social distancing vs. (b) Social optimal policy average utility
(expressed in $1.5 Million/year) as a function of expected network immunity: Here αR =
0, αI = 0.1, αS = 0.9, ι = 0.5 and κt(x) = exp(1 − x)κt, so that κt(1) = κt is given
in Table 1. (c) The average utility gain vs. (d) relative utility gain for a representative
individual by following social optimal policy vs. voluntary social distancing over different
age groups.
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(a)
(b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7: (a) Voluntary social distancing vs. (b) Social optimal policy average utility
(expressed in $1.5 Million/year) as a function of expected network immunity: Here αR =
0, αI = 0.1, αS = 0.9, ι = 0.5 and κt(x) =
8
(1+x)3κt, so that κt(1) = κt is given in Table 1.
(c) The average utility gain vs. (d) relative utility gain for a representative individual by
following social optimal policy vs. voluntary social distancing over different age groups.
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5 Conclusion
We have studied a heterogeneous SIRD epidemic process when a network underlies social
contact. For given social distancing strategies, we have established results on the ampli-
fication of the epidemic. Based on the network and the epidemic characteristics we have
defined a relevant infection matrix. The network structure - captured by the singular value
of the infection matrix – characterizes the amplification effects of the epidemic from the
initially infected set to a final set of infected individuals. Quantities such as the epidemic
reproduction number R0 are established and can be used as a warning signal to identify
for example parts of the networks that are highly vulnerable. Vaccination and targeted
social distancing can be applied in accordance in such areas to make R0 smaller than one.
Next, we have studied the equilibrium of the social distancing game. Our theoretical results
establish that the voluntary social distancing will always fall short of the social optimum.
The social optimum itself is of course dependent on the type. We calibrate the model to
the characteristics of the Covid-19 epidemic, as current in the literature. We note that the
gap between the utility in the social distancing equilibrium and the social optimum is due
for its most part to the fact that deaths rates given infection have a significant dependence
on what fraction of the population is infected, for instance because hospital capacity reach.
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A Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs of all propositions and theorems in the main text.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Let pi = P(i ∈ R(∞)/R(0)). Hence, pi = 1 if i ∈ I(0) and otherwise pi ≤
∑n
j=1B
(s)
ji pj ,
which writes for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n as
pi ≤ 1 (i ∈ I(0)) +
n∑
j=1
B
(s)
ji pj . (39)
We thus obtain
n∑
i=1
pi ≤
n∑
i=1
1(i ∈ I(0)) +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
B
(s)
ji pj
= |I(0)|+
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
B
(s)
ji
)
pj ≤ |I(0)|+B(s)max
n∑
j=1
pj .
We conclude E [|R(∞)|]− |R(0)| = ∑ni=1 pi ≤ 11−B(s)max |I(0)|. The second statement follows
using the Markov inequality. Namely, for any k > 0 we have
P
(
|R(s)(∞)| − |R(0)| ≥ k
1−B(s)max
|I(0)|
)
≤ 1
k
.
by the Markov inequality.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Recall that from (39) we have
pi ≤ 1(i ∈ I(0)) +
n∑
j=1
B
(s)
ji pj .
Let p = [p1, p2, . . . , pn] denote the vector with components pi,1 be the vector with all
components equal to 1 and 1I(0) be the vector with component 1 for i ∈ I(0) and 0 for
i /∈ I(0). By Equation (39), we have
p ≤ 1I(0) +Bs)p.
Denoting by || · || the Euclidean norm, we have
||p|| ≤ ||1I(0) +Bp|| ≤ ||1I(0)||+ ||Bp|| ≤
√
|I(0)|+ λmax(B(s))||p||.
33
We thus have for λmax(B
(s)) < 1 that ||p|| ≤
√
|I(0)|
1−λmax(Bs)) . Furthermore by the Cauchx-
Schwarz inequality,
E [|R(∞)|]− |R(0)| =
∑
i∈[n]
pi = ||1Tp|| ≤ ||1T || ||p|| =
√
n||p||.
We conclude (if λmax(B
(s)) < 1)
E [|R(∞)|]− |R(0)| ≤ 1
1− λmax(B)
√
n|I(0)|,
and the second statement follows using the Markov inequality.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Consider the heterogeneous SIRD epidemics spreading on G(n) satisfying (C1) − (C4). In
what follows, instead of taking a graph at random and then analyzing the epidemics, we
use a standard coupling argument which allows us to study epidemics and the graph at the
same time, revealing its edges dynamically while the epidemic spreads.
Consider a vertex i with type ti and di (labelled) free (not yet paired) half-edges. We
call a half-edge type (s, t)-susceptible, infective or removed according to the type of vertex
it belongs to. A key step in the proof will be to decide from the beginning on the (random)
infection threshold of each susceptible individual, denoted by Θi for individual i, defined as
the (minimum) number of infected neighbor each individual can tolerate before it becomes
infected.
Since the (normalized) infection last ρ = 1 days and the meeting happens at rate β
(s)
t
over all edges for a susceptible individual with type t, degree d and following social activity
s, it is easy to see that
P(Θ = θ) = e−(θ−1)β
(s)
t
(
1− e−β(s)t
)
=: p
(s)
t,d(θ), (40)
for θ = 1, 2, . . . , d. Hence, µ
(s)
t,dp
(s)
t,d(θ) will be the asymptotic fraction of susceptible individ-
uals with type d, degree d, following social activity s and getting infected after exactly θ
infected neighbors. We see that the model is equivalent to (type-dependent) independent
threshold model for configuration model.
In the following, we first extend the results of [Amini, 2010, Amini et al., 2013, Lelarge, 2012b]
on independent threshold model in configuration model, allowing for heterogeneous types
and initial nodes removal. The theorem will then imply Theorem 2.3.
Theorem A.1. Consider the type-dependent independent threshold model with threshold
distribution p
(s)
t,d(θ) for all susceptible individuals with type t, degree d and social distancing
s, on random graph G(n)n satisfying (C1)− (C4). Let x(s)∗ be the largest fixed point solution
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x ∈ [0, 1] to x = f (s)(x) where
f (s)(x) :=
λR
λ
+ αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d∑
θ=1
dµ
(s)
t,d
λ
p
(s)
t,d(θ)P (Bin(d− 1, 1− x) ≤ θ − 1) . (41)
We have for all  > 0 w.h.p.
|R(s)(∞)|
n
≥αR + αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d∑
θ=1
µ
(s)
t,dp
(s)
t,d(θ)P
(
Bin(d, 1− x(s)∗ ) ≥ θ
)
− .
Moreover, if x
(s)
∗ is a stable fixed point of f (s)(x), then
|R(s)(∞)|
n
p−→ αR + αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d∑
θ=1
µ
(s)
t,dp
(s)
t,d(θ)P
(
Bin(d, 1− x(s)∗ ) ≥ θ
)
, (42)
and, the final fraction (probability) of susceptible nodes with degree d ∈ N, type t ∈ T and
social distancing strategy s ∈ S satisfies:
|S(s)t,d (∞)|
n
(s)
S,t,d
p−→
d∑
θ=1
p
(s)
t,d(θ)P
(
Bin(d, 1− x(s)∗ ) ≤ θ − 1
)
. (43)
The proof of above theorem is provided in Appendix B. We now proceed with the
proof of Theorem 2.3 using the above theorem with p
(s)
t,d(θ) = e
−(θ−1)β(s)t
(
1− e−β(s)t
)
, for
θ = 1, 2, . . . , d. In this case, using the binomial theorem, we have
d∑
θ=1
p
(s)
t,d(θ)P (Bin(d− 1, 1− x) ≤ θ − 1) =
d∑
θ=1
e−(θ−1)β
(s)
t
(
1− e−β(s)t
)
P (Bin(d− 1, 1− x) ≤ θ − 1)
=
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d−1
,
which implies that
f (s)(x) =
λR
λ
+ αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
dµ
(s)
t,d
λ
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d−1
.
as in Theorem 2.3. Moreover, the final fraction (probability) of susceptible nodes with
degree d ∈ N, type t ∈ T and social distancing strategy s ∈ S satisfies:
|S(s)t,d (∞)|
n
(s)
S,t,d
p−→
d∑
θ=1
e−(θ−1)β
(s)
t
(
1− e−β(s)t
)
P
(
Bin(d, 1− x(s)∗ ) ≤ θ − 1
)
=
(
x
(s)
∗ +
(
1− x(s)∗
)
e−β
(s)
t
)d
.
Hence, to prove Theorem 2.3, it only remains to prove there is a unique solution x
(s)
∗ ∈
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(0, 1) to the fixed point equation x = f (s)(x) which is a stable solution. Note that f (s)(0) > 0
since αS > 0 and f
(s)(1) = λR/λ + λS/λ = 1 − λI < 1. Moreover, f (s)(x) is strictly
increasing in x which implies there is a unique solution x
(s)
∗ ∈ (0, 1) to the fixed point
equation x = f (s)(x) and this is a stable solution (since f (s)(x) is strictly increasing).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2.4
The proof of Theorem 2.4 is based on Theorem 2.3 and a theorem by Janson [Janson, 2009a]
on percolation in random graphs with given vertex degrees. Suppose that (C1)− (C4) hold
and λI = αI = 0. We first show that if R
(s)
0 < 1, then the number of susceptible individuals
that ever get infected is op(n). We prove that in the subcritical case, if λI = 0 then
x < f (s)(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1). Indeed f (s)(1) = 1 (note that if λI = 0, we have λ = λR + λS
which implies f (s)(1) = 1). Further,
(
f (s)(x)− x
)′
=αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
(
1− e−β(s)t
) d(d− 1)µ(s)t,d
λ
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d−2
− 1
≤
(αS
λ
)∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
(
1− e−β(s)t
) ∞∑
d=0
d(d− 1)µ(s)t,d = R(s)0 − 1 < 0.
Since xI(τ) = λx
(
x− f (s)(x)), we infer that
lim
αI→0
x
(s)
∗ → 1,
which implies that (by Theorem 2.3), the number of susceptible individuals that ever get
infected is op(n).
We now consider the case R
(s)
0 > 1. Let us consider again the independent threshold
model with threshold distribution
p
(s)
t,d(θ) := e
−(θ−1)β(s)t
(
1− e−β(s)t
)
.
Let only look at the structure of the subgraph obtained by removing all nodes with
threshold higher than 1. Then each susceptible individual with type t, social activity s and
degree d will remain in the percolated graph with probability
p
(s)
t,d(1) = 1− e−β
(s)
t .
The result of Janson [Janson, 2009a] on site percolation in configuration model implies
that if
R
(s)
0 :=
(αS
λ
)∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
p
(s)
t,d(1)
∞∑
d=0
d(d− 1)µ(s)t,d > 1
then w.h.p. there is a giant connected component (where the fraction is bounded away from
0) in the percolated random graph. Since all individuals present in the percolated random
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graph have threshold 1, the infection of any individual in the giant component will trigger
the infection to whole component which implies Theorem 2.4.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We define a function g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] via the following,
g(z) := inf
x∈[0,1]
{x : fγ(z)(x) = x}.
It can be easily seen that fγ(z)(0) > 0, fγ(z)(1) < 1. In conjugation with the continuity of
x 7→ fγ(z)(x), we conclude that for any z ∈ [0, 1], the set {x : fγ(z)(x) = x} is nonempty
and closed, and hence g(z) ∈ (0, 1) is well-defined.
Now we show that z 7→ g(z) is decreasing in z, which implies that (28) has at most one
solution. Suppose we have 0 < z1 < z2 < 1.
We have (set Ft
(
`
(−1)
t,d
)
= 1 and )
fγ(z)(x). =
λR
λ
+ αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d
λ
µt,dγ
(s)
t,d (z)
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d−1
=
λR
λ
+ αS
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d
λ
µt,d
K∑
s=0
(
Ft
(
`
(s−1)
t,d (z)
)
− Ft
(
`
(s)
t,d(z)
))(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d−1
=
λR
λ
+ αS
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d
λ
µt,d
K∑
s=0
Ft
(
`
(s−1)
t,d (z)
)
((
x+ (1− x)e−β(s)t
)d−1
−
(
x+ (1− x)e−β(s−1)t
)d−1)
.
Hence, by using (A1)− (A2), fγ(z)(x) is strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing
function of z (since F is strictly increasing cdf function). So that we have fγ(z1)(x) >
fγ(z2)(x) for any x ∈ [0, 1], and
fγ(z2)(g(z1))− g(z1) < fγ(z1)(g(z1))− g(z1) = 0.
Combing with the fact that fγ(z2)(0) ≥ 0 and the continuity of x 7→ fγ(z2)(x), there exists
an x < g(z1) such that f
γ(z2)(x) = x, which implies that g(z2) < g(z1).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Recall that γe (the equilibrium without social planner) is such that
κ(x)
(
1− (xγ∗ + (1− xγ∗)e−β)d)VaR1−γe(L) = pi
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while the social planner chooses γs which maximisez u¯social(γ), i.e.
γs = arg max
γ∈[0,1]
{
u¯social(γ) := pi(1− γ)− κ(xγ∗)
∫ 1
γ
VaR1−u(L)du
}
.
Since xγ∗ is increasing in γ and κ(.) is a decreasing function, κ(x
γ
∗) is a decreasing function
of γ and we have
u¯′social(γe) =−
dκ(xγ∗)
dγ
∫ 1
γ
VaR1−u(L)du+ κ(xγe∗ )VaR1−γe(L)− pi
≥κ(xγe∗ )VaR1−γe(L)− pi = pi
(
1
1− (xγ∗ + (1− xγ∗)e−β)d − 1
)
≥ 0,
and the theorem follows.
B General independent threshold epidemics on G(n)
In this section we present the proof of Theorem A.1.
B.1 Markov chain transitions
We first describe the dynamics of the (independent threshold) epidemic on G(n) as a Markov
chain, which is perfectly tailored for asymptotic study. At time 0 the threshold of each sus-
ceptible individual is distributed randomly, according to (type dependent) distribution 40.
For θ ∈ N, let n(s)t,d,θ denotes the number of susceptible individuals with type t ∈ T ,
degree d and social activity s ∈ S which are given threshold θ = 1, 2, . . . , d. Hence,
n
(s)
t,d,θ/nS
p−→ µ(s)t,dp(s)t,d(θ)
as n→∞. At a given time step T , individuals are partitioned into infected I(T ), susceptible
S(T ) and removed R(T ). We further partition the class of susceptible nodes according to
their type, social activity and threshold
S(T ) =
⋃
t,d,s,θ
S(s)t,d,θ(T ).
At time zero, I(0) andR(0) contains respectively the initial set of infected and recovered
individuals. Hence, by (C1), we know |I(0)|/n→ αI and |R(0)|/n→ αR as n→∞.
At each step we have one interaction only between two individuals, yielding at least one
infected. Our processes at each step is as follows :
• Choose a half-edge of an infected individual i;
• Identify its partner j (i.e. by construction of the random graph in the configuration
model, the partner is given by choosing a half-edge randomly among all available
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half-edges);
• Delete both half-edges. If j is currently uninfected with threshold θ and it is the θ-th
deleted half-edge from j, then j becomes infected.
Let us define S
(s)
t,d,θ,`(T ), 0 ≤ ` < θ, the number of susceptible individuals with type
t, degree d, social activity s, threshold θ and ` removed half-edges (infected neighbors) at
time T . We introduce the additional variables of interest:
• XS(T ): the number of (alive) susceptible half-edges belonging to susceptible individ-
uals at time T ;
• XI(T ): the number of (alive) half-edges belonging to infected individuals at time T ;
• XR(T ): the number of (alive) half-edges belonging to initially recovered individuals
at time T ;
• X(T ) = XS(T ) +XI(T ) +XR(T ): the total number of (alive) half-edges at time T .
Hence, by Condition (C3), we have (as n→∞)
XI(0)/n −→ λI , XI(0)/n −→ λI , XR(0)/n −→ λR and X(0)/n −→ λ.
Hence, X(0) =
∑n
i=1 di denote the total number of half-edges in the network and, since
at each step we delete two half-edges, the number of existing (alive) half-edges at time T
will be
X(T ) = X(0)− 2T. (44)
It is easy to see that the following identities hold:
XS(T ) =
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d∑
θ=1
θ−1∑
`=0
(d− `)S(s)t,d,θ,`(T ), (45)
XI(T ) =X(0)− 2T −XR(T )−XS(T ). (46)
The contagion process will finish at the stopping time T∗ which is the first time T ∈ N
where XI(T ) = 0. The final number of susceptible individual with type t, social distancing
s, degree d will be
S
(s)
t,d (T∗) =
∞∑
θ=1
θ−1∑
`=0
S
(s)
t,d,θ,`(T∗).
By definition of our process S(T ) =
{
S
(s)
t,d,θ,`(T )
}
t,d,s,θ,`
and XR(T ) represent a Markov
chain. We write the transition probabilities of the Markov chain. There are four possibilities
for the B, the partner of a half-edge of an infected individual A:
1. B is infected, the next state is S(T + 1) = S(T ) and XR(T + 1) = XR(T );
2. B is initially recovered. The probability of this event is XR(T )X(0)−2T . The changes for the
next state will be XR(T + 1) = XR(T )− 1.
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3. B is uninfected of type t, degree d, social distancing strategy s, threshold θ and this
is the (` + 1)-th deleted half-edge with ` + 1 < θ. The probability of this event is
(d−`)S(s)t,d,θ,`(T )
X(0)−2T . The changes for the next state will be
S
(s)
t,d,θ,`(T + 1) = S
(s)
t,d,θ,`(T )− 1,
S
(s)
t,d,θ,`+1(T + 1) = S
(s)
t,d,θ,`(T ) + 1.
4. B is uninfected of type t, degree d, social distancing strategy s, threshold θ and this
is the θ-th deleted incoming edge. The probability of this event is
(d−θ+1)S(s)t,d,θ,`(T )
X(0)−2T .
The changes for the next state will be
S
(s)
t,d,θ,θ−1(T + 1) = S
(s)
t,d,θ,θ−1(T )− 1.
Let ∆T be the difference operator: ∆TX := X(T + 1)−X(T ). We obtain the following
equations for the expectation states variables, conditional on FT (the pairing generated by
time T ), by averaging over the possible transitions:
E [∆TXR|FT ] = − XR(T )
X(0)− 2T , (47)
E
[
∆TS
(s)
t,d,θ,0|FT
]
= −dS
(s)
t,d,θ,0(T )
X(0)− 2t ,
E
[
∆TS
(s)
t,d,θ,`|FT
]
=
(d− `+ 1)S(s)t,d,θ,`−1
X(0)− 2t −
(d− `)S(s)t,d,θ,`
X(0)− 2t . (48)
The initial condition satisfies
XR(0)/n −→ λR, S(s)t,d,θ,`(0)/n
p−→ αSµ(s)t,dp(s)t,d(θ)1(` = 0),
as n→∞. Remark that we are interested in the value of S(s)t,d,θ,`(T∗), where T∗ is the first
time that XI(T∗) = 0. In case T∗ < X(0), the Markov chain can still be well defined for
t ∈ [T∗, X(0)) by the same transition probabilities. However, after T∗ it will no longer be
related to the epidemic process and the value XI(T ), representing for t ≤ T∗ the number
of alive half-edges belonging to infected individuals, becomes negative. We consider from
now on that the above transition probabilities hold for T < X(0).
We will show next that the trajectory of these variables throughout the algorithm is
a.a.s. (asymptotically almost surely, as n → ∞ ) close to the solution of the deterministic
differential equations suggested by these equations.
B.2 Fluid limit of the epidemic process
Consider the following system of differential equations (denoted by (DE)):
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x′R(τ) = −
xR(τ)
λ− 2τ ,
(s
(s)
t,d,θ,0)
′(τ) = −ds
(s)
t,d,θ,0(τ)
λ− 2τ ,
(s
(s)
t,d,θ,`)
′(τ) =
(d− `+ 1)s(s)t,d,θ,`−1(τ)
λ− 2τ −
(d− `)s(s)t,d,θ,`
λ− 2τ , (DE),
with initial conditions
xR(0) = λR, s
(s)
t,d,θ,`(0) = αSµ
(s)
t,dp
(s)
t,d(θ)1(` = 0).
Lemma B.1. The system of ordinary differential equations (DE) admits the unique solution
xR(τ), s(τ) :=
{
s
(s)
t,d,θ,`(τ)
}
s,t,d,θ,`
in the interval 0 ≤ τ < λ/2, with
xR(τ) = λRx, s
(s)
t,d,θ,`(τ) := µ
(s)
t,dp
(s)
t,d(θ)
(
d
`
)
xd−`(1− x)`, (49)
where x =
√
1− 2τ/λ and 0 ≤ ` < θ.
Proof. Let u = u(τ) = − 12 ln(λ − 2τ). Note that u(0) = − 12 ln(λ), u is strictly monotone
and so is the inverse function τ = τ(u). We write the system of differential equations with
respect to u:
x′R(u) = −xR(u),
(s
(s)
t,d,θ,0)
′(u) = −ds(s)t,d,θ,0(u),
(s
(s)
t,d,θ,`)
′(u) = (d− `+ 1)s(s)t,d,θ,`−1(u)− (d− `)s(s)t,d,θ,`(u).
Then we have
xR(u) = λRe
−(u−u(0)) =
λR
λ
√
λ− 2τ√
λ
= λRx,
d
du
(s
(s)
t,d,θ,`+1e
(d−`−1)(u−u(0))) = (d− `)s(s)t,d,θ,`(u)e(j−`−1)(γ−γ(0)),
and by induction, we find
s
(s)
t,d,θ,`(u) = e
−(d−`)(u−u(0)) ∑`
r=0
(
d− r
`− r
)(
1− e−(u−u(0))
)`−r
s
(s)
t,d,θ,r(u(0)).
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By going back to τ , we have
s
(s)
t,d,θ,` = x
d−`∑`
r=0
s
(s)
t,d,θ,r(0)
(
d− r
`− r
)
(1− x)`−r.
Then, by using the initial conditions, we find (for 0 ≤ ` < θ)
s
(s)
t,d,θ,`(τ) := αSµ
(s)
t,dp
(s)
t,d(θ)
(
d
`
)
xd−`(1− x)`.
A key idea to prove Theorem 2.3 is to approximate, following [Wormald, 1995], the
Markov chain by the solution of a system of differential equations in the large network
limit. We summarize here the main result of [Wormald, 1995].
For a set of variables x1, ..., xb and for D ⊆ Rb+1, define the stopping time
TD = TD(x1, ..., xb) = inf{t ≥ 1, (t/n;x1(t)/n, ..., xb(t)/n) /∈ D}.
Lemma B.2 ([Warnke, 2019, Wormald, 1995]). Given integers b, n ≥ 1, a bounded domain
D ⊆ Rb+1, functions (f`)1≤`≤b with f` : D → R, and σ-fields Fn,0 ⊆ Fn,1 ⊆ . . . , suppose
that the random variables
(
Y `n(t)
)
1≤`≤b are Fn,t-measurable for t ≥ 0. Furthermore, assume
that, for all 0 ≤ t < TD and 1 ≤ ` ≤ b, the following conditions hold
(i) (Boundedness). max1≤`≤b |Y `n(t+ 1)− Y `n(t)| ≤ β,
(ii) (Trend-Lipschitz). |E[Y `n(t+1)−Y `n(t)|Fn,t]−f`(t/n, Y 1n (t)/n, ..., Y `n(t)/n)| ≤ δ, where
the function (f`) is L-Lipschitz-continuous on D,
and that the following condition holds initially:
(iii) (Initial condition). max1≤`≤b |Y `n(0)− yˆ`n| ≤ αn, for some
(
0, yˆ1, . . . , yˆb
) ∈ D.
Then there are R = R(D, L) ∈ [1,∞) and C = C(D) ∈ (0,∞) such that, whenever α ≥
δmin{C,L−1}+R/n, with probability at least 1− 2be−nα2/(8Cβ2) we have
max
0≤t≤σn
max
1≤`≤b
|Y `n(t)− x`(t/n)n| < 3eCLαn,
where
(
x`(t)
)
1≤`≤b is the unique solution to the system of differential equations
dx`(t)
dt
= f`(t, x
1, ..., xb) with x`(0) = yˆ`, for ` = 1, ..., b,
and σ = σ(yˆ1, . . . , yˆb) ∈ [0, C] is any choice of σ ≥ 0 with the property that (t, x1(t), ..., xb(t))
has `∞-distance at least 3eLCα from the boundary of D for all t ∈ [0, σ).
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We apply Lemma B.2 to the epidemic process described in Section B.1. Let us define,
for 0 ≤ τ ≤ λ/2,
xS(τ) =
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d∑
θ=1
θ−1∑
`=0
(d− `)s(s)t,d,θ,`(τ), (50)
xI(τ) =λ− 2τ − xR(τ)− xS(τ). (51)
with s
(s)
t,d,θ,` and xR given in Lemma B.1. With Bin(d, x) denoting a binomial variable with
parameters d and x, we have
xS(τ) = αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d∑
θ=0
µ
(s)
t,dp
(s)
t,d(θ)(dy)P (Bin(d− 1, 1− x) ≤ θ − 1) , (52)
and, using x =
√
1− 2τ/λ and Equation 51,
xI(τ) = λ− 2τ − λRx− αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d∑
θ=1
µ
(s)
t,dp
(s)
t,d(θ)(dy)P (Bin(d− 1, 1− x) ≤ θ − 1)
= λx
(
x− λR
λ
− αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d∑
θ=1
dµ
(s)
t,d
λ
p
(s)
t,d(θ)P (Bin(d− 1, 1− x) ≤ θ − 1)
)
= (λx)
(
x− f (s)(x)
)
.
Since x∗ is the largest solution in (0, 1) to the fixed point equation x = f (s)(x), we have
x∗ =
√
1− 2τ∗/λ where τ∗ is the smallest τ ∈ (0, λ/2) such that xI(τ) = 0.
B.3 Proof of Theorem A.1
We now proceed to the proof of Theorem A.1. We base the proof on Lemma B.2.
We first need to bound the contribution of higher order terms in the infinite sums (52).
Fix  > 0. By Condition (C3),
λS =
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
dµ
(s)
t,d <∞
Then, there exists an integer ∆, such that
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=∆
dµ
(s)
t,d < ,
which implies that for all 0 ≤ τ ≤ λ/2,
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=∆
d∑
θ=1
dµ
(s)
t,dp
(s)
t,d(θ)P (Bin(d− 1, 1− x) ≤ θ − 1) < . (53)
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Recall that the number of susceptible vertices with type t ∈ T , social distancing s ∈ S
and degree d is n
(s)
S,t,d. Again by condition (C3),
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
dn
(s)
S,t,d/n→ λS <∞.
Therefore, for n large enough,
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∑∞
d=∆
dn
(s)
S,t,d/n < . and for all 0 ≤ T ≤ X(0)2 ,
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=∆
∞∑
θ=1
θ−1∑
`=0
dS
(s)
t,d,θ,`(T )/n < . (54)
For ∆ ≥ 1, we denote
y∆ :=
(
xR(τ), s
(s)
t,d,θ,`(τ)
)
d<∆, s∈S, 0≤`<θ≤d
and
Y ∆n :=
(
XR(T ), S
(s)
t,d (T )
)
d<∆, s∈S, 0≤`<θ≤d
,
both of dimension b(∆), and xR(τ), s
(s)
t,d,θ,`(τ) are solutions to a system (DE) of ordinary
differential equations. Let
x
(s)
∗ = max{x ∈ [0, 1] : f (s)(x) = x}.
For the arbitrary constant  > 0 fixed above, we define the domain D as
D = {
(
τ,yK
) ∈ Rb(K)+1 : − < τ < λ/2−  , − < xR(τ) < λ,− < s(s)t,d,θ,`(τ) < 1}.
(55)
The domain D is a bounded open set which contains the support of all initial values of the
variables. Each variable is bounded by a constant times n (C0 = 1). By the definition of
our process, the Boundedness condition is satisfied with β = 1. The second condition of the
theorem is satisfied by some δn = O(1/n). Finally the Lipschitz property is also satisfied
since λ− 2τ is bounded away from zero. Then by Lemma B.2 and by convergence of initial
conditions, we have :
Corollary B.3. For a sufficiently large constant C, we have
P(∀t ≤ nσH(n),YKn (t) = nyK(t/n) +O(n3/4)) = 1−O(b(K)n−1/4 exp(−n−1/4)) (56)
uniformly for all t ≤ nσH(n) where
σH(n) = sup{τ ≥ 0, d(yK(τ), ∂D ) ≥ Cn−1/4}.
When the solution reaches the boundary ofD, it violates the first constraint, determined
by τˆ = λ/2 − . By convergence of X(0)n to λ, there is a value n0 such that ∀n ≥ n0,
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X(0)
n > λ− , which ensures that τˆn ≤ X(0)/2.
Using (53) and (54), we have, for 0 ≤ T = nτ ≤ nτˆ and n ≥ n0:
|XI(T )/n− xI(τ)| ≤ |X(0)/n− λ|+ |XR(T )/n− xR(τ)| (57)
+
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
∞∑
θ=1
θ−1∑
`=0
d|S(s)t,d,θ,`(T )/n− s(s)t,d,θ,`(τ)|
≤
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∆∑
d=0
∞∑
θ=1
θ−1∑
`=0
d|S(s)t,d,θ,`(T )/n− s(s)t,d,θ,`(τ)|+ 3. (58)
and similarly, the total number of susceptible individuals at time T satisfies
|S(T )/n− s(τ)| ≤
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∆∑
d=0
∞∑
θ=1
θ−1∑
`=0
|S(s)t,d,θ,`(T )/n− s(s)t,d,θ,`(τ)|+ 3., (59)
where, by Lemma B.1,
s(τ) =
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
∞∑
θ=1
θ−1∑
`=0
s
(s)
t,d,θ,`(τ) (60)
= αS
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∞∑
d=0
d∑
θ=1
µ
(s)
t,dp
(s)
t,d(θ)P (Bin(d, 1− x) ≤ θ − 1) . (61)
We obtain by Corollary B.3 that
sup
T≤τˆn
|XI(T )/n− xI(τ)| ≤ 2+ oL(1), and (62)
sup
T≤τˆn
|S(T )/n− s(τ)| ≤ 2+ oL(1). (63)
We now study the stopping time Tn and the size of the epidemic |Rs)(∞)/R(0)|.
Consider x∗ =
√
1− 2τ∗/λ is a stable fixed point of f (s)(x). Then by definition of x∗
and by using the fact that f (s)(1) ≤ 1, we have f (s)(x) > x for some interval (x∗ − x˜, x∗).
Then
xI(τ) = (λx)
(
x− f (s)(x)
)
is negative in an interval (τ∗, τ∗+ τ˜). Let  such that 2 < − infτ∈(τ∗,τ∗+τ˜) xI(τ) and denote
σˆ the first iteration at which it reaches the minimum. Since xI(σˆ) < −2 it follows that
with high probability XI(σˆn)/n < 0, so Tn/n = τ∗ +O() + oL(1). The conclusion follows
by taking the limit → 0.
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